In Financial Cryptography 2013, Bringer, Chabanne and Patey proposed two cryptographic protocols for the computation of Hamming distance in the two-party setting. Their first scheme uses Oblivious Transfer and provides security in the semi-honest model. The other scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) and is claimed to provide full security in the malicious case. The proposed protocols have direct implications to biometric authentication schemes between a prover and a verifier where the verifier has biometric data of the users in plain form.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, several commercial organizations have invested in secure electronic authentication systems to reliably verify identity of individuals. Biometric authentication mechanisms is one of the wide-spread popular technology because of the cost-effective improvements in sensor technologies and in the efficiency of matching algorithms [1] . The biometric data (i.e. templates) of a user is inherently unique. This uniqueness provides the reliability of the individual to be securely authenticated for accessing to an environment when the biometric data is kept as secret. The biometric data cannot be directly used with conventional encryption techniques because these data are inherently noisy [2] . Namely, whenever two sample of data extracted from the same fingerprint, these data would not be exactly same. In this context, in order to eliminate noisy Mehmet Sabır Kiraz (corresponding author), Ziya Alper Genç and Süleyman Kardaş and is with the Department of Cryptology, TUBITAK BILGEM UEKAE, Kocaeli, Turkey (e-mail: {mehmet.kiraz, ziya.genc, suleyman.kardas}@tubitak.gov.tr Ziya Alper Genç is also with theİstanbul Ş ehir University and Süleyman Kardaş is also with Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey. nature of the biometric templates, several error correction techniques have been proposed in the literature [3] , [4] , [5] .
Biometric authentication over insecure network raises more security and privacy issues. The primary security issue is the protection of the plain biometric templates against malicious adversary because they cannot be replaced with a new one, once they are compromised. The common biometric authentication system is as follows. For each user, the biometric template is stored in a database during the enrollment phase. In the verification phase, a new fresh acquisition of a user is compared to the template of the same individual stored in the database. The verification phase can either be processed within the smart card (i.e, on-card matching), or in a system outside the card (i.e, off-card matching) [6] . Since the biometric template is not necessarily transferred to the outside environment, the on-card matching technique protects the template. In both techniques, the authentication protocol should not expose the biometric template without the user's agreement. In order to ensure privacy of the user, the biometric template should be stored in an encrypted form in the database and no one including the server side can learn any information on link between the user and her biometric data. But still, it should be possible to verify whether a user is authentic [7] .
In order to thwart, the security and privacy issue described above for the biometric authentication, several matching algorithms are proposed in the literature. Many of them utilize the computation of the Hamming distance of two binary biometric templates. Note that the Hamming distance does not reveal any significant information to any polynomially bounded adversary. In this context, in Financial Cryptography 2013, Bringer et al. [8] have proposed two secure Hamming distance computation schemes based on Oblivious Transfer. In their proposals, the authors integrate the advantages of both biometrics and cryptography in order to improve the overall security and privacy of an authentication system. The first scheme is solely based on 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) and it achieves full security in the semi-honest setting, and one-sided security in the malicious setting. The second scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) and is claimed to provide full security against malicious adversaries.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• In this paper, we first revisit the Hamming distance computation protocol SHADE of Bringer et al. [8] . We show that SHADE is insecure in the malicious model. Namely, the full scheme has a severe weakness on computation of Hamming distance. We show that this weakness allows any malicious adversary to violate the completeness of the protocol, i.e., a different value of Hamming distance from the actual one. The protocol flaw resides in the method used for validation of the inputs of a user. Using zero-knowledge proofs, the protocol forces the user to submit valid inputs, i.e. pairs of integers (x, y) that differ by 1. The method succeeds at checking the difference, however, it fails at validation of the pairs, i.e. a malicious party can submit invalid pairs (x − 2 −1 , x + 2 −1 ). Since SHADE computes the Hamming distance by summing each side and evaluating the difference, a verifier would compute an incorrect value. As a practical example for biometric authentication, we show that a malicious adversary can pass the authentication by running the algorithm at most O(n) times (instead of running O(2 n ) times, where n is the input length.). Last but least, an adversary with knowledge of distribution of inputs can mount a more powerful attack. Note that we believe this attack is of independent interest and may be applied to other schemes. • In order to eliminate this severe weakness, we propose a new method for input validation. This way, we remove the fault in the protocol and enhance the security of it. We also show that the computational complexity of the fixed protocol is comparable with the insecure protocol. Moreover, we optimize the new input validation method for biometric authentication systems. We prove the security of our protocol using ideal/real simulation paradigm in the standard model [9] , [10] , [11] and [12] . • Lastly, we consider the efficiency of the protocol and show that running a COT is not necessary in the second option of the protocol. We show that VOT is sufficient instead of using complete COT protocol which contains additional commitments and zero-knowledge proofs [13] . This leads a considerable improvement in the computational complexity of the protocol.
B. Organization
Section 2 gives the related work on the computation of Hamming distance and biometric authentication systems. Section 3 provides the security and privacy model for biometric authentication protocol. Section 4 reviews the two schemes in the protocol, basic scheme which uses OTs and full scheme based on COT of bit-strings. In Section 5, we present an attack to the full scheme of Bringer et al. and show that their protocol is insecure. In Section 6, we propose a security fix and discuss the efficiency of their protocol in the malicious model. Here, we show that VOT is sufficient instead of COT. In Section 7 we prove our fixed protocol using simulation-based paradigm. The complexity analysis of the proposed protocol is shown in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
There has been a large amount of research done on the security and efficiency of biometric authentication systems. In this section, we review the most recent works for biometric authentication.
Hamming distance together with Oblivious Transfers is one of the most elegant tools used in biometric authentication systems. For example, Jarrous and Pinkas propose binHDOT protocol [14] to compute Hamming distance based on 1-outof-2 Committed Oblivious Transfer with Constant Difference (COTCD) of Jarecki and Shmatikov [15] and Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) of Hazay and Lindell [16] . The protocol also uses commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee that each party follows the protocol. The protocol provides full security in the malicious model. One OPE protocol and n COTCDs are invoked to compute the Hamming distance between two strings of n bits.
The SCiFI (Secure Computation of Face Recognition) of Osadchy et al. is the first secure face identification system which is well suited for real-life applications [17] . The SCiFI system consist of two parts: a client and a server. The server prepares face recognition database that contains representations of face images. This computation is done offline. In the verification phase, the client prepares her face representation and then a cryptographic protocol which uses Paillier encryption and Oblivious Transfer running between the server and the client. The authors implemented a complete SCiFI system in which a face is represented with a string of 900 bits. The authors designed the system by aiming the minimal online overhead: the most significant requirement for computing Hamming distance between this length of bit strings is 8 invocations of 1-out-of-2 OTs.
Bringer et al. [18] used biometric authentication/identification for access control. Note that it is important to securely store the biometric template to the server. Using conventional encryption schemes for securing the biometric template can provide a strong protection. Note that conventional cryptography requires exact match while biometrics always have a threshold value, therefore biometric authentication over the encrypted domain is a challenging task. In this paper, a cryptographic scheme is given for biometric identification over an encrypted domain which uses Bloom Filters with Storage and Locality-Sensitive Hashing. This paper is interesting since it proposes the first biometric authentication/identification scheme over encrypted binary templates which is stored in the server's database.
In another paper, Bringer et al. [19] proposed a security model for biometric-based authentication protocols, relying the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [20] . This system allows the biometric match to be performed in the encrypted domain in such a way that the server cannot identify which user is authenticating. The proposed system requires storage of biometric templates in plain form. In order to protect the privacy, the system ensures that the biometric feature stored in the database cannot be explicitly linked to any identity, but the DB only verifies whether the received data belongs to an identity in the database.
Erkin et al. [21] propose a privacy preserving face recognition system on encrypted messages which is based on the standard Eigenface recognition system [22] . In their protocol design, they utilized semantically secure Paillier homomorphic public-key encryption schemes and Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard (DGK) cryptosystem [23] , [24] . Later, Sadeghi et al. make an improvement over the efficiency of this system [25] . In this study, they merge the eigenface recognition algorithm using homomorphic encryption and Yao's garbled circuits. Their protocol improves the scheme proposed by Erkin et al. significantly, i.e. it has only a constant number of O(1) rounds and most of the computation and communication performed during the pre-computation phase.
Tuyls et al. [26] propose a template protection scheme for fingerprint based authentication in order to protect biometric data. During the enrollment phase, Alice's biometric features X is extracted, the Helper Data [27] W is computed (that is required by error-correction mechanism), a one-way hash function H is applied to S and the data (Alice, W, H(S)) is stored to the server. Here, S is a randomly chosen secret value such that G(X, W)=S for a shielding function G [28] . During the verification phase, after Alice's noisy biometric data X is extracted, the server sends W back to the sensor. The sensor computes S = G(X,W) and H(S). Then, the server compares H(S) with H(S), and grants access if the results are equal. The Helper Data is sent over the public channel, i.e. an adversary may obtain W. Tuyls et al. however design the system in such a way that the adversary obtains minimal information about X by capturing W.
Kulkarni et al. [29] propose a biometric authentication scheme based on Iris Matching. Their scheme uses the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme of Boneh et al. [30] which allows an arbitrary number of addition of ciphertexts but supports only one multiplication operation between the ciphertexts. The scheme is based on Paillier encryption and bilinear pairing. This scheme consists of two phases: Enrollment phase and Verification phase. During the Enrollment phase, first the necessary keys are generated by the server and sent to the client securely. Secondly, the client's biometric data is XORed with the key, and a mask value is XORed with a mask key. Both XORed values are sent to the server. During the Verification (authentication) phase, the client sends an encryption of an authenticated biometric data to compute the distance. The protocol is proven to be secure in the semihonest model.
Kerschbaum et al. [31] propose an authentication scheme in a different setting. Particularly, they assume that there are two parties where each of them has a fingerprint template. They would like to learn whether the templates match, i.e. generated from the same fingerprint. However, they do not want to reveal the templates if there is no match. Their protocol uses secure multi-party computation which is secure only in the semi-honest model.
Barni et al. propose a privacy preserving authentication scheme for finger-code templates by using homomorphic encryption which is secure only in the semi-honest model [32] , [33] . Their protocol allows the use of the Euclidean distances to compare fingerprints in such a way that the biometric data is reduced for computing a smaller encrypted value that is sent to the server.
SECURITY AND PRIVACY MODEL
We adopt the standard simulation-based definition of ideal/real security paradigm in the standard model which is already highlighted in [9] , [10] , [11] and [12] . In simulationbased security, the view of a protocol execution in a real setting is compared (a statistical/computational indistinguishable manner) as if the computation is executed in an ideal setting where the parties send inputs to a trusted third party F that performs the computation and returns its result.
In an ideal setting, the parties send their inputs x and y to a trusted third party F who computes f (x, y) (which is the output of the Hamming distance in our setting) and sends f 1 (x, y) to the first party and f 2 (x, y) to the second party (f 1 (x, y) and f 2 (x, y) can be ⊥ if only one party is required to learn the output). Note that the adversary, who controls one of the parties, can choose to send any input it wishes to the trusted third party F, while the honest party always sends its specified input. In a real execution of a protocol, one of the parties is assumed to be corrupted under the complete control of an adversary A. Note that we always assume that the adversary A corrupts one of the two parties at the beginning of the protocol execution and is fixed throughout the computation (it is known as static adversary model).
Informally, a protocol is secure if for every real-model adversary A interacting with an honest party running the protocol, there exists an ideal-model adversary S interacting with the trusted party computing f , such that the output of the adversary and the honest party in the real model is computationally indistinguishable from the output of simulator and the honest party in the ideal model. More formally, Definition 3.1. (Simulation-based security) Let f and the protocol Π be as above. We say that the protocol Π f securely computes the ideal functionality F if for any probabilistic polynomial-time real-world adversary A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time an ideal-model adversary S (called the simulator) such that
Note that the above definition implies that the parties already know the input lengths (by the requirement that |x| = |y|).
Note that VOT and COT protocols are used as sub-protocols. In [34] , [35] , it is shown that it is sufficient to analyze the security of a protocol in a hybrid model in which the parties interact with each other and assumed to have access to a trusted third party that computes a VOT (resp. COT) protocol for them. Thus, in the security analysis of our protocol the simulator will play the role of the trusted third party for VOT (resp. COT) functionality when simulating the corrupted party. Roughly speaking, in the hybrid model, parties run an arbitrary protocol like in the real model, but have access to a trusted third party that computes a functionality (in our case VOT or COT) like in the ideal model. A protocol is secure if any attack on the real model can be carried out in the hybrid model. 4 . THE BASIC AND THE FULL SCHEME OF BRINGER et al.
In this section, we briefly describe the basic and the full scheme of [8] used for computation of Hamming distance between two bit strings. The basic scheme uses oblivious transfer (OT) and provides full security when the parties are semi-honest and one-sided security in the malicious model. The full scheme uses committed oblivious transfer (COT) [36] and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [13] to compute the Hamming distance in malicious model. Each scheme has two options to select the party which computes and outputs the result meaning that each party may act as a server and the other as a client.
A. The Basic Scheme
The basic scheme is designed to provide secure and efficient method for computing the Hamming distance between two bit strings in semi-honest model. The intuition behind this protocol is that if both parties are semi-honest, the OT protocols are sufficient to preserve privacy.
The basic scheme in [8] is roughly as follows:
Using the local notation, let P 1 and P 2 have the inputs X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y n } respectively. At the first step, P 1 randomly picks r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ R Z n+1 and computes R = n i=1 r i . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the parties run oblivious transfer in which P 1 acts as the sender and P 2 acts as the receiver. More precisely,
Next, P 2 computes T = n i=1 t i . In the last step, • 1 st Option: P 2 sends T to P 1 . P 1 computes and outputs T − R. • 2 nd Option: P 1 sends R to P 2 . P 2 computes and outputs T − R. In the case of one party is malicious, the privacy of the honest party is still provided because of the flexibility at the end of the protocol.
Compared to the related protocols for secure computation of Hamming distance in the semi honest model, the basic scheme of Bringer et al. [8] is the most efficient protocol as they proved in Section 6 of [8] .
The authors also mention that the basic scheme can be optimized by using the state of the art techniques, i.e. extended oblivious transfer, as first proposed by Ishai et al. in [37] and later improved in [38] . This technique leads to an efficient construction which extends k OTs to n OTs (k < n) in the random oracle model that is secure against only semi-honest adversaries (note that hash functions can be replaced with RO model in the real case).
B. The Full Scheme
The full scheme of Bringer et al. considers the case where the parties are assumed to be malicious. Note that running OT protocol does not prevent a party from modifying her input. Secondly, the receiver may send a different value than the actual OT output that she computes. In order to prevent such scenarios, the authors propose to use the 1-out-of-2 Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) protocol of Kiraz et al. presented in [36] . Though, in Section 5, we show that the idea of input validation for P 1 is not sufficient and can be exploited with success.
Before we proceed, let's continue with the description of the full scheme.
At the first step of the protocol, P 2 commits to her inputs y i 's and proves that each y i is either 0 or 1. At the same time, P 1 generates random r i 's from the plaintext space of the commitments scheme and computes R = n i=1 r i but this time she commits to (a i , b i ) = (r i + x i , r i + x i ). Let's denote Commit(M ) for a commitment functionality of a message M (note that Commit includes randomness and we hide it for the sake of simplicity). P 1 publishes the commitments A i = Commit(a i ) and B i = Commit(b i ). Note that Commit functionality is basically a (2,2)-threshold homomorphic encryption which is used as a commitment scheme (e.g., ElGamal [39] , Paillier [40] ). Furthermore, using these commitments she proves that her inputs a i 's and b i 's differ by 1. Next, the COT protocol is run for each i. At the end of each COT, P 2 receives t i = r i + (x i ⊕ y i ) and both parties receive C i = Commit(t i ) . When all the COTs are run,
At this point, there are again two options:
C n because of the underlying homomorphic property [8] . P 2 sends T to P 1 and proves that C commits to T. P 1 computes C = C 1 · . . . · C n and checks the proof. If all verifications are successful, P 1 outputs T − R. • 2 nd Option: P 1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) = A 1 · . . . · A n · B 1 · . . . · B n . P 1 sends R to P 2 and proves that K commits to 2R + n. P 2 computes K = A 1 · . . . · A n · B 1 · . . . · B n and checks that K = Commit(2R + n). If all verifications are successful, P 2 outputs T − R. The authors in [8] claims that the above scheme is fully secure against malicious parties. However, in the next section we show that a malicious P 1 can easily break the completeness property of the scheme.
SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF THE
BRINGER'S PROTOCOL et al.
We are now ready to describe the protocol flaw of the full scheme in detail. The security flaw is due to the proof for validation of P 1 's input bits. The flaw allows a malicious P 1 to change the Hamming distance between her input and P 2 's input. In the next section, we will propose a solution to fix the flaw by designing a new proof for validation. We show that the complexity of the new proof for the validation of P 1 's input bits for biometric authentication systems is significantly reduced.
Furthermore, we also analyze the protocol from the efficiency perspective and show that the complexity of the protocol can be significantly improved. COT protocol is basically designed as a sub-protocol in order to prevent possible malicious behaviors between sender and receiver, where the committed output of COT is expected to be used in further parts of the system. However, the committed outputs of COT are not used in the case that P 1 computes the Hamming distance. Hence, we will point out that verifiable OT will be sufficient in the case that P 1 computes the Hamming distance. This will eliminate to compute n commitments together with the zero-knowledge proofs (for each run of COT protocol). In this way, we will improve the efficiency of the protocol by using VOT instead of COT when P 1 is the server.
A. Attack to the Full Scheme
The protocol is insecure in the case where P 1 is malicious. This is because P 1 is free in the sense that she can commit to any pair such that the absolute value of the difference of the encrypted values pairs is 1, i.e. P 1 proves that |b i − a i | = 1 where the pair (a i , b i ) is supposed to be (r i + x i , r i + x i ). However, a malicious P 1 may choose invalid pairs in a special way together with the proofs that difference between each pair is equal to 1. Our attack uses the fact that at the end of each COT, P 2 receives either t i = r i + g or t i = r i + h and computes the sum T = n i=1 t i , where g, h are within the finite cyclic group. Note that g is expected to be equal to x i and h to x i . However, with a careful choosing of g's and h's, some g's can be neutralized by some h's in this sum. Hence, the completeness property of the protocol can be violated.
Before we describe the attack we need to highlight that the underlying COT scheme uses threshold ElGamal encryption as a commitment mechanism, i.e. Commit(x i ) = Enc(x i ) where x i ∈ G where G is a large finite cyclic group (of a prime order) [36] . This guarantees the existence of the inverse of n.
Without loss of generality assume that #0's in P 2 's input Y is (i.e., #1's in Y is n − ). We would like to highlight that the Hamming distance can be scalable with the knowledge of #0's (similarly #1's) in P 2 as follows: a malicious P 1 may use (a i , b i ) = (r i + g, r i + h) for a predetermined Hamming distance value HD = g + (n − )h such that g − h = 1. Then,
For an example, if a malicious P 1 desires Hamming distance HD to be 0 then she choose g = 1 − n −1 . Next, h= g-1= -n −1 . Hence, P 1 may use (a i , b i )=(r i +(1− n −1 ), r i − n −1 ) as input. To be more concrete, the attack is given as follows:
• P 2 commits to her inputs y i 's and proves that each y i is either 0 or 1. P 1 then generates random r i 's and computes R= n i=1 r i .
• Next, instead of following the protocol, P 1 computes (a i , b i )=(r i + (1 − n −1 ), r i − n −1 ) and publishes A i = Commit(a i ) and B i = Commit(b i ). Note that for each i, |b i − a i | = 1 and hence, the proofs will pass successfully. • At the end of each COT, P 2 receives either t i = r i + (1 − n −1 ) or t i = r i − n −1 . After COTs are run, P 2 computes the sum
Therefore, the Hamming distance d H (X, Y )=T − R will be equal to 0. We stress that the weakness in the scheme is destructive as we prove that a relatively insignificant information leakage causes computation of a completely inaccurate result. Namely, without knowledge of the real X, P 1 fools P 2 into outputting an incorrect Hamming distance value without being detected. Furthermore, a malicious P 1 with the prior knowledge of is capable of manipulating HD as it is easy to find g and h using above equation. This is interesting because of the following result: The authors in [41] propose a privacypreserving protocol for iris-based authentication using Yao's garbled circuits. They show that Hamming distance between two iris codes owning by the same person is rarely close to 0 or to n between different people. Therefore, the scalability feature of our attack can be easily adopted to various settings.
In this part, we propose the most general case and in the next section we give a practical attack for biometric authentication schemes reducing the computational complexity of an attacker from O(2 n ) to O(n), where n is the input length. Namely, an attacker without any prior knowledge can authenticate herself using only n trials instead of 2 n .
B. A Special Case: Apply the Generic Attack to Biometric Authentication Systems
In this section, we apply the proposed attack for biometric authentication systems with full success. Note that the matching procedure for fingerprint, palm print or iris actually measures the Hamming distance between the two bit-strings X and Y that encode the biometric sample and template (e.g., [7] , [42] , [29] ).
The attack basically uses n (instead of 2 n ) protocol runs to successfully authenticate to the system, where n is the input length. In general, for an n-bit string Y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ), an attacker must roughly try 2 n search for X of length n to pass the threshold value which is infeasible for large n. However, using the proposed attack a corrupted P 1 can authenticate the system after at most n trials (because the number of 0s or 1s in Y is between 0 ≤ ≤ n). More precisely, for = 1 to n a corrupted P 1 runs the method proposed previous section. Because 0 ≤ ≤ n, the authentication will be successful with at most n trials without any knowledge of the real input X.
C. Apply the Generic for Uniformly Distributed Inputs
This attack can also be directly applied to uniformly distributed bit strings X and Y . In this scenario the input bit-strings of P 2 (which is generated from a biometric template) is expected to be independent and identically distributed. That is, there are nearly equal number of zeros and ones in an input bit string. Below, we show that this fact easily allows an adversary to minimize the Hamming distance and successfully deceive a verifier: 1) P 2 commits to her inputs y i 's and proves that each y i is either 0 or 1. 2) P 1 picks random r i 's and computes R =
The authors in [8] uses homomorphic encryption as the commitment mechanism. Since those cryptosystems work in a group of prime order, the multiplicative inverse of 2 always exists, i.e. P 1 can commit to (a i , b i ) = (r i −2 −1 , r i +2 −1 ). Next P 1 proves that |b i − a i | = 1 which always holds. Note that P 1 does not prove the validity of her input, i.e, she does not prove that the x i 's are equal to either 0 or 1. 4) COTs are run and, in one half of the COTs (because of the uniform distributed inputs), P 2 receives t i =r i − 2 −1 and t i = r i + 2 −1 in the other half. 
6) Using the 2 nd option, K = Commit P2,i (2R + n) = A 1 · . . . · A n · B 1 · . . . · B n . 7) P 1 sends R and the proof that K commits to 2R + n to P 2 . 8) P 2 computes d H (X, Y ) = T − R = 0 and authenticates P 1 .
D. Our solution for the attack
The weakness of the full scheme is due to the wrong method used for validation of the input pairs {(a i , b i ), ∀i = 1, . . . , n}. A malicious P 1 can exploit this weakness as described in the previous section. Therefore, designing cryptographic protocols should be carefully checked against these kinds of tricks.
As a security fix, we modify the step in which P 1 generates random r i values. Namely, after generating each r i , P 1 will compute and publish A i = Commit(r i + x i ), B i = Commit(r i + x) and Commit(r i ). Moreover, P 1 will send the proof of:
that is equivalent to
This statement contains one more relation than the original proof in [8] . Although the computation cost of the protocol is slightly increased, the validation process is now secure. To see this, assume that (a i + b i − 2r i = 1) ∧ |b i − a i | = 1 is true. This implies |b i − a i | = 1 and (a i + b i − 2r i = 1). Here, there are two cases:
In Section 7 we provide the security analysis of the improved scheme.
1) More Efficient Solution for Biometric Authentication: Biometric authentication systems are designed to tolerate a small level of errors. In general, the measure process is not perfect in most environments and thus, instead of exact match, a biometric system authenticates a party that matches with a small error to prevent false negatives.
The authentication process must also have a small complexity to compute the result in the fastest way. Therefore each party must prove nothing more than the necessary and sufficient data for validation of her input.
These motivations lead us to design a more efficient proof that can be used in the biometric authentication systems. Namely, after generating and publishing the commitments to a i , b i , r i as in the previous section, P 1 sends the proof of:
The above relation has a smaller complexity than |b i − a i | = 1 while it still provides higher security. This input validation method is an efficient solution for our attack in the case of biometric authentication. Note that an adversary may input (a i , b i ) = (r i − 2 −1 , r i + 2 −1 ) and pass the validation but its Hamming distance will be n 2 which is the expected value of Hamming distance between two random inputs with length n.
E. Efficiency Enhancements
In this section, we present some improvements for the efficiency of the protocol. First, we reduce the computational complexity of the protocol using VOT instead of COT without sacrificing the security. Namely, COT will not be necessary in the case where P 2 computes the final Hamming distance. Next we will reduce the complexity of the proof for the validity of P 1 's inputs in the case of biometric authentication.
1) COT versus VOT: Verifiable OT and Committed OT are natural combination of 2 1 -OT and commitments. Let Commit S and Commit C be commitments by Sender and Chooser respectively. The functionality of committed OT is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Verifiable OT is defined if the CommitC (xy) is not required as output. We show that the basic protocol in [8] does not have to use COT in the case that the server computes the result.
We note two aspects:
What to transfer bits
2) Efficiency Improvement Using VOT: In this section, we point out a computational complexity reduction. Note that COT is run for the malicious case in [8] . COT requires the receiver to obtain the output together with its commitment to this value. In the beginning of the protocol, the input of P 1 is an n-bit string X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and the input of P 2 is an n-bit string Y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ). After running the protocol there are two options:
• P 1 obtains the Hamming distance d H (X, Y ) and P 2 obtains nothing • P 2 obtains the Hamming distance d H (X, Y ) and P 1 obtains nothing In case P 2 computes the Hamming distance, the committed values from the output of COT will not be used. In such case, these commitments are not necessary to be computed and, therefore VOT will be sufficient to use. We realized this observation after writing the COT protocol explicitly with the overall protocol instead of using as a black box. If P 1 computes the Hamming distance COT will still be necessary to use. 6. OUR FIXED AND IMPROVED SCHEME We have made modifications to the full scheme in [8] : we fix the security weakness described in Section 5 and improve the efficiency of the protocol as mentioned in Section 5. Now, we give the corrected scheme with all details:
Inputs:
• P 1 inputs an n-bit string X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) • P 2 inputs an n-bit string Y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) Outputs:
• 1 st Option: P 1 obtains d H (X, Y ) and P 2 obtains nothing • 2 nd Option: P 2 obtains d H (X, Y ) and P 1 obtains nothing Protocol: 1) P 2 commits to her inputs y i 's and proves that each of y i is either 0 or 1. 2) P 1 generates random r i 's from the plaintext space of Commit and computes R = n i=1 r i .
5) For each i = 1, . . . , n, a COT is run where • P 1 acts as the sender and P 2 as the receiver.
1 nd Option: Run VOT a) P 1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) = A 1 · . . . · A n · B 1 · . . . · B n . b) P 1 sends R to P 2 and proves that K commits to 2R+n. c) P 2 computes K = A 1 · . . . A n · B 1 · . . . · B n and checks that K = Commit(2R + n). d) If all verifications are successful, P 2 outputs T − R. 2 st Option: Run COT a) P 2 computes C = Commit(T ) = C 1 · . . . · C n . b) P 2 sends T to P 1 and proves that C commits to T. c) P 1 computes C = C 1 · . . . · C n and checks the proof. d) If all verifications are successful, P 1 outputs T − R.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME
A cryptographic protocol is secure if the view of an adversary in a real protocol execution can be generated from the information the adversary has (i.e., its input and output). In this section, we proved the security of the proposed protocol by constructing a simulator, which is given only the input and output of the "corrupted" party, and generating a view that is indistinguishable from the view of the adversary in a real protocol execution [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] . This implies that the adversary learns no information from the real protocol because it could generate anything from what it sees in such an execution by itself.
Theorem 7.1. The proposed protocol, which is shown in Figure 3 , is secure in the presence of static malicious adversaries.
Fig. 3: Our Improved Scheme
Proof. We show that given a party is corrupted, there exists a simulator that can produce a view to the adversary that is statistically indistinguishable from the view in the real protocol execution based on its private decryption share as well as public information.
Case-1-P 1 is corrupted. Let A P1 be an adversary corrupting P 1 . We construct a simulator S P1 and show that the view of the adversary A P1 in the simulation with S P1 is statistically close to its view in a hybrid execution of the protocol with a trusted party running the VOT (resp. COT) protocol. Since we assume that the VOT (resp. COT) protocol is secure, we analyze the security of the protocol in the hybrid model with a trusted party computing the VOT (resp. COT) functionality. Note that the simulator S P1 knows X, sk P1 and d H (X, Y ). The simulator proceeds as follows: i as in the real protocol. c) S P1 can simulate the proof since it knows the committed input valueT 's and sk P1 . Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier's view when interacting with honest P 2 .
Case-2-P 2 is corrupted. Let A P2 be an adversary corrupting P 2 , we construct a simulator S P2 as follows. Since we assume that the COT (resp. VOT) protocol is secure, we analyze the security of the protocol in the hybrid model with a trusted party computing the COT (resp. VOT) functionality. Note that the simulator S P2 knows Y = y 1 . . . y n , sk P2 and d H (X, Y ). The simulator proceeds as follows: 1) S P2 picks arbitraryX =x 1 . . .x n .
2) S P2 picksr i ∈ R Z * q and computesR P2 = n i=1r i . Next, S P2 computes (ã i ,b i ) = (r i +x i ,r i +¯i x) ∀i = 1 . . . n. S P2 computesÃ i ,B i andR i as in the real protocol. S P2 can again simulate the proofs since he knows the committed input values and sk P2 . 3) In case VOT is run: a) S P2 first extracts the input of R P1 from VOT functionality in the hybrid model and then sends the input to the trusted party. S P2 next computesK = Commit P2,i (2R + n). S P2 can simulate the proof since it knows the committed input values and sk P2 . In case COT is run: a) S P2 first extracts the input of R P1 from COT functionality in the hybrid model and then sends the input to the trusted party and learn C i ∀i = 1, . . . , n. S P2
computes Commit(T ) = n i=1C i .
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier's view when interacting with honest P 1 .
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF OUR FIXED PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of our fixed protocol and compare it with the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8] . In our protocol, the number of invoked zeroknowledge proofs and multiplication of ciphertexts remain the same. However, we have improved the efficiency of the protocol significantly by replacing n COTs with n VOTs in the second option of the protocol where P 2 computes the final Hamming distance. In this way, we show that n number commitments, 2n number of partial decryption and 2n number of ZK proofs can be removed. The number of commitments of P 1 is increased from 2n to 3n in order to guarantee the validity of P 1 's inputs. This is the price that should be paid to make the protocol secure. The complexity comparison of the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8] and our fixed protocol is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Scheme of Bringer et al.
Our Fixed Scheme P 1 P 2 P 1 P 2 Commitments 2n n 3n n ZK proofs n OTs n COTs 1 st opt: n COTs 2 nd opt: n VOTs Multiplication of ciphertexts 1 st opt: n 2 nd opt: 2n
Fig. 4: Complexity Comparison
Our analysis shows that the additional cost of the security fix is only n number of commitments made by P 1 , independent of the party which computes the final Hamming distance. However, in the case that P 2 computes the final Hamming distance, the computational savings that can be achieved by replacing the n COTs with n VOTs are far more larger. In general, a COT protocol requires one more flow than a VOT protocol in which the chooser recommits to its received value and proves that the new commitment equals to her previous committed input. In particular, the full scheme in [8] uses the COT scheme of [36] where each run of a COT protocol requires one commitment, two partial decryption of a ciphertext and two zero-knowledge proofs in addition to a VOT protocol. As a result, we avoid unnecessary use of two zero-knowledge proofs and two partial decryptions. Consequently, we improve the efficiency of the protocol significantly while we establish the security of the protocol.
CONCLUSION
Bringer et al. [8] proposed two Hamming distance computation schemes which can be applied to biometric authentication systems. In semi-honest setting, the basic scheme in [8] is the most efficient up to date. However, their full scheme is insecure in the malicious case.
In this paper, we show that the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8] has a critical security issue. In our attack, we show that an adversary without having any prior knowledge can make the verifier compute an incorrect Hamming distance. In the case of biometric authentication systems, a malicious user can easily authenticate without any information about the honest party. Namely, the complexity of the security of the system is reduced from O(2 n ) to O(n), where n is the input length. Moreover, we fix the protocol by placing a robust method for input validation without adding a significant cost. We also enhance the efficiency of their protocol significantly by showing that Verifiable Oblivious Transfer (VOT) is sufficient to use instead of Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) in the second option of the full scheme. VOT reduction avoids the unnecessary computation of one commitment, two zeroknowledge proofs and two partial decryption of the ciphertext for each bit of the input.
